ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A significant part of world population lives in flood prone coastal and delta areas. About 23% of the world population residing coastal zone and 10 % of the population living in low-lying areas (39) , are threatened by floods. For example, damages from coastal storms and floods in the USA in 2012 accounted for almost $54 billion of estimated overall losses (40) . Particularly, the Netherlands are vulnerable to a rising sea level and increasing frequency of river flooding. About 60 to 70% of the country's population and economic value is concentrated in areas that are at risk of flooding from the sea and/or rivers. The situation may be further threatened by climate change affecting in particular the sea level rise. Coastal and delta areas were historically developed due to their proximity to marine and river transportation. Further developments are attracted to historic centers by agglomeration forces as well as by rich environmental amenities. As a result, exposure and vulnerability in coastal areas rapidly increase due to the clustering of population and growth of property values in flood-prone areas (26) . As a matter of fact, urban developments are capital intensive and are highly path-dependent (9) , which means that where and how much of coastal and riverfront properties get developed depends on a series of previous decisions, e.g. location of past developments and past flood risk management (FRM) policy.
Worldwide governments develop FRM policies that aim to reduce flood risk. It can be reduced by decreasing either probabilities of the hazard, i.e. through structural engineering solutions such as dikes or beach nourishments, or the damages, i.e. through zoning, financial measures to distribute risk across stakeholders, proper land-use planning, or flood-proofing buildings.
Flood insurance is considered to be a vital element of a FRM policy (38) . A well-designed flood insurance program: (i) spreads risks across actors, locations and time and assures funds available for loss coverage (35) , (ii) increases public awareness of flood risks (36) , (iii) often leads to price discounts (7) , (iv) promotes damage mitigation measures (8) , and (v) improves the efficiency of use of scarce land (43) . A multi-layer disaster insurance program (MLDIP) in a form of a public-private partnership (PPP) (5) , (8) , (17) , (20) , (33) may include, e.g., a layer of private insurance, a risk transfer layer through reinsurance or/and catastrophe bonds and credits, and a layer of government contribution. A MLDIP requires the analysis of mutually dependent risk exposures of the involved stakeholders. For example, if an insurer wants to decrease the chances of bankruptcy, he may decrease the chances by imposing higher premiums or decreasing coverage, take reinsurance or buy a catastrophe bond. The burden of losses is shifted away from the insurer but may be unevenly redistributed among other stakeholders, i.e., individuals, government, reinsurance companies, and can lead to their instability or ruin. Thus, the success of a losssharing program depends on the mutual (systemic) stability of the involved heterogeneous stakeholders.
This requires the analysis of complex multivariate joint probability distributions of losses dependent on decisions of various agents and hazards leading to the development of region-specific catastrophe flood models.
Catastrophe models comprise several modules: a hazard generator, vulnerability and financial modules. Catastrophe models use rich spatial data and evaluate premiums based not only on historical observations but also considering various socio-economic and climatic scenarios (1) , (23) , (25) . However, in many of these models the pricing of catastrophe risk is based on the Average Annual Loss (AAL) without explicit accounting for goals and constraints of the involved stakeholders. A risk load is often expressed in terms of standard deviation and administrative costs load (34) , or only in AAL (1) . Due to the skewedness of catastrophe risks as well as spatial dependencies of losses on policies, this approach may appear to be misleading (2) , (5) . Mean and standard deviation alone cannot serve as appropriate indicators for catastrophe risk pricing. They characterize normal risks and do not capture specifics of heavy-tailed catastrophic loss distributions. In contrast, quantile-based, in particular, Value-at-Risk (VaR, (42) , (47) ) and
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) indicators, gain popularity in determining catastrophic insurance policies (2) , (41) . In particular, geographically-detailed ICRM 1 model incorporating quantile-related risk functions and stochastic optimization (STO) procedures allows proper capturing of spatio-temporal profiles of catastrophe risks for designing robust insurance and involved stakeholders arrangements (2) , (17) , (18) . The goal of this paper is to develop an ICRM-based approach to evaluate location specific robust insurance policies and compare them with traditional AAL pricing in outside dikes in the Rijnmond- (31) ) and a stochastic optimization procedure to generate flood loss scenarios and quantify robust insurance premiums and coverages for flood-prone locations outside main flood defense system, i.e. outside dike rings. Until recently insurance from river and coastal flooding did not exist in the Netherlands, leaving a post-disaster relief program as the only financial FRM instrument. The issue has been debatable since some consider it unfeasible (30) , (32) while others argue it is feasible under various reinsurance schemes (1) .
Yet, the first flood insurance contracts became available at the end of 2012 (3) but only for areas protected by dikes. Although several studies exist on how to enhance flood insurance system in the Netherlands (1) , (27) , (28), (30) , (32) , they primarily analyze inside-dikes flood risks. For example, Aerts and Botzen (1) apply the AAL principle to derive flood-related insurance premiums for large dike-ring areas in the Netherlands.
This paper studies insurability of flood risks explicitly simulating insurance supply and demand balances. The robust balance substantially depends on the choice of coverages and premiums creating the capacity of insurance to sustain the floods and the willingness of individuals to pay the premiums. We use such economically-sound risk functions as overpayments by individuals and shortfalls of insurers to derive robust solutions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 presents a simple example illustrating misleading policy implications resulting from using AAL for collective damages. It shows the need for quantile-based approaches. Section 2.2 outlines a general ICRM multi-agent spatially-explicit model that is specified in section 3 for the case study region. The proposed model includes non-smooth stochastic risk functions to achieve a robust systemic solvency in the form of a probabilistic equilibrium between the insurance supply and the demand of insured. In the case of a single aggregated insurer (a catastrophe fund) and an aggregated insured (region) this equilibrium is reduced to a VaR type quantile-based constraints. Section 3 is also devoted to a detailed description of the case study region, including data availability and main ICRM modules. Numerical experiments in section 4 report on how ICRM allows designing a robust floodloss sharing program in the RiD region by polling risks through a flood insurance relying on locationspecific premiums including also potential risk transfer through a contingent credit for buffering the risk, and a partial government compensation. The section demonstrates that robust location-specific premiums compared to AAL, increase the stability of insurance and reduce the demand for other risk transfer measures. Involvement of the government and introduction of a credit increases the demand for the insurance and helps to fulfill its liabilities while avoiding insolvency. Concluding remarks are summarized in section 5.
INTEGRATED CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT MODEL

Insurability of catastrophic risks
In the Netherlands, flood safety standards in protected areas vary between 200 and 10000 year floods return periods (29) . Although floods may happen rarely, their abrupt occurrence in time and space comes as "spikes" that cannot be properly modeled "on average", say a 100-year flood may occur any year in the . Assume that each of 100 locations has an asset of the same type. An extreme event destroys all of them at once with probability 1/100. Consider also a situation without the extreme event, but with each asset still being destroyed independently with the same probability 1/100. From an individual point of view, these two situations are identical: an asset is destroyed with probability 1/100, i.e., individual losses are the same. Collective (social, catastrophic) losses are much higher.
In the first case 100 assets are destroyed with probability 1/100, whereas in the second case 100 assets are destroyed with probability 100 100 − , which is practically 0. In both cases, expected losses are equal, while probabilities of collective interdependent losses 1/100 and independent 100 -100 are strikingly different. Analyzing insurability of interdependent location-specific catastrophic losses requires developing an ICRM model and STO methods enabling to simulate collective damages to design a robust portfolio of coverages and premiums. This creates a systemic solvency preventing in a probabilistic sense shortfalls of insurers and overpayments by locations.
Stochastic Integrated Catastrophe Risk Management Model
This section introduces a basic geographically-explicit ICRM model (17) , (19) , (21) that is specified in section 3
for a case study in the Netherlands. To account for multiple risk management stakeholders, the study region is subdivided into sub-regions or locations
Locations may correspond to a collection of households, flood-protection zone, municipality, etc. For example in (1) 
Let us note that random variables t i R and 
Individuals (locations) are concerned with their wealth, which depends on whether the amount of premiums that they pay to the insurers does not exceed the compensation of losses at time
where
Events (3)- (4) determine the stability (resilience) of the insurance program, in a sense, its systemic solvency. Therefore, a critical issue is to avoid these events as much as possible.
For example, by minimizing the expected uncovered losses
where p is a critical probability threshold of the program's systemic insolvency (failure, default) that may occur, say, only once in 100 years. The notation
is used to denote a probability of insolvency as a general function of
E . An example of constraints (5) may be constraints
Pr or equations (10), implicitly induced by optimal solutions of STO model (8) with specific risk (penalty) functions. Unfortunately, the straightforward use of probabilistic constraints (5) in the ICRM model is practically impossible due to their often discontinuous piece-wise constant and analytically intractable character owed to the discrete distributions of the random vector ω . Therefore, section 3.2.5
formulates the main ICRM model as a convex STO problem with specific non-smooth risk (penalty) functions enabling to derive optimal solutions implicitly inducing this type constraints (see (9) , (10)). This problem is effectively solved by the linear programming methods (see eqs. (11)- (14)). Proposed in section 3 approach is central for large-scale integrated risk management problems (see e.g. [17] - [21] ). Sections 4.2.1-4.2.3 demonstrate how it is possible to achieve the required level of p .
CASE STUDY AND THE REGIONAL MODEL
Case study region
The case-study covers the outside dike rings areas in the RiD region including Rotterdam (Figure 1 ).
Though many studies exist on how to enhance flood insurance system (1) , (27) , (28), (30), (32) in the Netherlands, they analyze primarily inside-dikes flood risks and consequent insurance premiums. This paper focuses on flood risks in the areas outside the main protections system and analyzes an example of a robust flood insurance program. We show how the robust location-specific premiums and coverages increase the stability and the attractiveness of a flood-loss sharing arrangement and, thus, insurability of risks, as compared with traditional AAL approach.
The RiD region is prone to both river and coastal flooding. The areas outside dike rings ( Figure 2) differ from the areas inside the main protections system in terms of physical aspects of flood risk and responsibilities among stakeholders in a number of ways (Table I ). Most important is that currently flood protection within the dike rings is fully the responsibility of the government, while for the outside dike ring areas there are no safety standards guaranteed by the government. New investments are at the risk of individuals, with no governmental compensation provided in the case of a hazard event. The Netherlands did not have insurance from river or coastal flooding until recently, which makes it difficult especially for the areas outside the main protections system to: (i) communicate risks, (ii) to take individual action to distribute losses in time, and (iii) to create stimuli for damage mitigation actions such as additional floodproofing of houses. 1:4000-to 1:10000 years -coastal floods. Probability of flood is location-specific and may be much higher than the official safety standard in the neighboring protected areas.
One homogeneous safety standard for the whole dike-ring. Properties are elevated above sea level, i.e. on dunes, man-made high elevation grounds, etc.
Many developments inside dike rings are below sea level (up to -6 meters). Flood water comes with low velocity and goes away quickly.
Flood water comes with high velocity and stays for a long period.
Flood protection and roles of different parties
Developments are at the risk on individuals (households or firms). Municipalities may prohibit some socially-vital activities in these areas, e.g. hospitals.
Government is responsible to assure safety standards prescribed by law.
Individuals are responsible for their own protection and damage in the case of flooding.
Government refund any possible damage from a flood event. Flood insurance does not exist but is argued to be financially feasible (44) .
Until recently flood insurance did not exist. First contracts to insure flood risks became available in 2013 (3) . The issue is debatable since some consider it unfeasible (30) , (32) while others think it is feasible under various reinsurance schemes (1) . Land use in the Rijnmond-Drecthsteden region (the colored area is the area outside the main protection system). Source: (11) .
Modules and data
This section describes main modules of the ICRM used for the analysis of optimal flood loss-sharing program in the case study area. In particular, the hazard, exposure and vulnerability modules (I, II and III, Figure 3 ) provide data inputs to estimate potential losses, i.e. damages in each location (Figure 3, IV) .
Based on the estimated damages, the ICRM model runs quantile-based stochastic optimization under a range of safety constrains across stakeholders (insurance companies, households and firms, government) to produce optimal risk-based location-specific insurance premiums and coverage (Figure 3, V) . We describe each module separately when discussing the data inputs into the ICRM model. 
Hazard module (I)
The geo-referenced estimates of water depth in the areas outside the main protection systems in RiD for various return periods floods were calculated. The LiDAR 2 elevation data on a 5mx5m cell was corrected to include local small embankments and structures (11) . The resulting 5mx5m water depths are used in the Deltaprogramme 3 and were reviewed by the Rotterdam Harbour Authority. In this paper we consider spatio-temporal damage patterns for "current climate" scenario and three flood scenarios (10-, 100-, and 1000-year floods).
Exposure data (II)
Exposure data (II) includes geographically explicit information on different land-uses in the case study region including geographically-referenced data on economy, transportation networks, buildings, population. For the case study region, these data have been compiled within HIS-SSM (Highwater Information System -Damage and Casualties Module (31) ). HIS-SSM is often used to support FRM policy decisions for inside-dike areas in the Netherlands. Exposure data include assumptions about economic 2 Light Detection and Ranging, a remote sensing method, e.g., http//oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html 3 Dutch climate adaptation program, http://www.deltacommissaris.nl/english/topics/ growth and infrastructure expansion in the case study region. The data on land use, roads, railroads and houses has been updated compared to earlier HIS-SSM versions (31) . The new data on houses provides detailed information on the location of each individual building and its attributes (number of houses, elevation etc.) (11) .
Vulnerability module (III)
Vulnerability curves reflecting damage for a particular land use at a particular water level and flood wave speed are the part of the HIS-SSM model. Originally designed for the inside-dikes areas, which are relatively homogeneous with respect to elevation, HIS-SSM operates at a scale of 100mx100m. Since buildings in the outside dikes areas are often elevated on an individual basis and vary greatly across locations, water-levels, and consequently damage, are highly location-specific. To be applicable to model damages in the outside-dikes areas the resolution of the HIS-SSM model has been reduced from 100m to 5m cell to capture all the obstructions, small levees and location-specific elevation in the water depth and vulnerability maps.
Loss estimates (IV)
Location specific damages (losses) for each of the 10-, 100-, 1000-year floods accounting for infrastructure developments in 2000, 2050, and 2100 years were estimated by HIS-SSM combining the data from the "Hazard", "Exposure", and "Vulnerability" modules. The damage estimation in HIS-SSM was adjusted to account for the features of the outside-dikes areas. Specifically, the damage functions and categories for residential buildings have been improved, categories and damage figures of agriculture, natural areas and the data on the presence of houses has been taken from another more detailed source and damage functions have been adapted (11) . To capture the situation in the areas outside main protection system, damage figures to agricultural and natural areas were set to zero. This was done since the high values for those categories are based on the presence of machinery, stables and high yield varieties, which is realistic only in areas with very low flood probabilities. The agricultural areas outside the primary defenses are situated along the rivers and are used for cattle breeding in summer. Cattle is removed in winter when peak flows occur, which makes damage negligible. The large natural areas outside the primary defenses become flooded deeply twice a day (every high tide) and their ecosystems benefit from those floodings.
These improvements in loss estimation resulted in a 60% damage reduction compared to the damage figures assessed in 2011 (11) . In 2013 further improvements were carried out mainly on damage figures, functions and data for companies and industries. Yet, these figures should be considered with care as several adjustments, especially to 10-year flood damage estimations, are likely to come in the next few years. Damage figures used in the current paper should be treated as illustrative to show the applicability of the ICRM model, its potential practical use, and new problems which can be addressed.
Damages for the areas outside the main protection system were calculated for the three return periods (Table II) . These figures are current best estimates for all damage categories including direct and indirect damages across 27 land use types. Thus, the figures are much higher than for example in our previous study (44) , which estimated damage to houses and house content only. The annual damage per residential house excluding any damage to firms and infrastructure in the areas outside the main protections system varies from 4-5 euro in Rotterdam and Dordrecht and up to 225-613 euro in Bergambacht and Nederlek for the current climate (44) . 
Regional Stochastic Integrated Catastrophe Risk Management Model (V)
For the case study, the general approach outlined in section 2 is specified to capture the specifics of available data, in particular, simulated by modules described in sections 3.2.1-3.2.4 scenarios of the flood and damages in the RiD region. The main goal of the case study is to compare impacts of locationspecific premiums derived by using regional ICRM model vs traditional AAL premiums. In the case study we assume that only one "aggregate" insurer or a catastrophe fund operates in the region. We ignore costs ) ( j ij q c and we also assume that The main concern regarding systemic insolvency of the flood insurance program is to avoid in a probabilistic sense events (6), (7) as much as possible:
{ } 
which represents random events (6), (7) by expected imbalances defined by non-smooth convex risk 
Introducing constraints (6), (7) into the optimization model (8) via risk functions generates forces reducing discrepancies in inequalities (6), (7) towards 0 and even equal 0 (see e.g. section 4, Figure 10a ). The first term in (8) stands for expected uncovered losses, the second is responsible for minimization of the expected shortfall (insolvency) of the insurance program whereas the third term represents expected overpayments by the insured. In this non-smooth stochastic model an aggregate insurance system or a catastrophe fund minimizes adjusted by the risk-functions total uncovered losses. However, this also implies more natural from the economic point of view profit maximization assumption. The lack of overpayments by insured and shortfalls of insurers increases demand for insurance, its coverages, hence, profits and compensations of insured, i.e., the welfare of all participating agents.
Formally, minimizing function ) (x F is equivalent to maximizing function 
) the following form (16) of systemic risk equilibrium:
. (9) The following example clarifies the role of parameters α and j β . is not applicable because it is satisfied only in the trivial case
Example (aggregate region
. As reviewer of the manuscript pointed out, the same holds also for events (6) and (7).
Equations (9) 
We can see that parameters α , j β , and coverages q affect this probability. Deeper analytical analysis of these interdependencies for general model (8) is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following we investigate the role of α , j β , reformulating the unconstrained STO model (8) . Using S scenarios, the model defined by equation (8) is equivalently replaced by the model: minimize
The model ( (11)- (14) that is solved very fast by the linear programming methods.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
Spatial patterns of the robust model-derived premiums
The main purpose of these experiments is to compare two alternative ways of calculating insurance premiums: the traditional annualization (AAL) approach and the robust derived with the regional ICRM model. Therefore, in the following we assume that 1 ) ( = ω τ , i.e., catastrophic floods may occur within a one year time interval with probabilities 1/10, 1/100, and 1/1000 corresponding to 10-, 100-, 1000-year floods, respectively. This is, in a sense, a worst-case situation for the robust premiums because the accumulation of premiums is not accounted for. Yet, losses occur as "spikes" in the region, and premiums have to be calculated properly based on location-specific risk exposures. In the RiD case study region, the robust quantile-based premiums derived according to (11) - (14) are computed at the resolution of 100mx100m, which approximately corresponds to a block of 16-25 residential houses. The resolution may be refined to represent specifics of some areas, e.g., a residential house, a shopping mall, concentrated infrastructure, intensive transportation node. Figure 6 shows spatial distribution of premiums aggregated to a neighborhood (local community) level and Figure 7 displays premiums as percent of the 100-year flood losses. While the area is relatively small, robust premiums show big spatial variability reflecting heterogeneity of location-specific risk exposures. The spatial heterogeneity of the robust premiums guarantees the stability of the insurance program. It also highlights the importance of spatially resolved policies. In the majority of neighborhoods, annual insurance premiums do not exceed 5000 euro for infrastructure, businesses and households. Few neighborhoods, where insurance premiums reach 50000-100000 euro per location and year, are characterized by high concentration of infrastructure and businesses. Businesses may suffer much larger damages compared to households since in addition to the direct property damage they also incur indirect damage from business interruption.
In the following we discuss in detail the advantages of robust premiums, compared to the AAL, for the design of flood-loss sharing program. 
Analysis of optimal insurance program per stakeholder
Analysis of the insurance program financial stability on the side of the insurer
By varying coefficients α and β in (11) Figure 11 , the expected deficit with AAL premiums is the biggest for 10-year event. For 100-year event, the capital deficit of the insurer is around 2.8 mln, and the insurer's expected shortfall is equal to 0.5 mln in the case of 1000-year flood scenario.
In model (11)- (14) , premiums underpayments may be avoided by adjusting the insurer's risk coefficient α . For example, Figure 11 .b shows the financial situation of the insurer if α is changed from 1 to 10. With robust premiums in the case of 10-year flood, the insurer's expected capital surplus of about 2 mln euro indicated by the negative value in Figure 11 .b (marked with "10-yr" on the horizontal axis). The insurer's reserve is still positive in the case of 100-year event, and only 1000-year flood causes about 0.1 mln euro capital deficit. 
Insurer's demand for financial instruments
Concluding remarks
This paper analyses the importance of properly designed integrated spatially explicit financial arrangements for sharing flood losses by comparing insurance premiums estimated based on average annual damage vs quantile-based premiums. We present an illustrative example of a robust insurance program for a case study region around Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The discussed loss-sharing program is based on pooling flood risks through private flood insurance, and a contingent credit to the insurance for "buffering" the risk. The success of this program depends on the mutual stability of the involved stakeholders. For the analysis of the stability, we use the ICRM model allowing to derive robust insurance policies, e.g., premiums and coverage of the insurer, involvement of individuals, accounting for complex interplay between multivariate spatially and temporally explicit probability distribution of flood losses and risk exposures of the stakeholders. Robust policies satisfy two goals: (i) to fulfill goals and constraints of the involved stakeholders, and (ii) to guarantee program's solvency under potential flood scenarios rather than one average event in the case study region. The ICRM is comprised of the geographically-detailed updated HIS-SSM model and of spatially-explicit quantile-based multi-agent multicriteria stochastic optimization procedure integrated as follows: 1) water depth levels are processed in HIS-SSM to calculate flood damages for 10-, 100-, and 1000-year floods; 2) stochastic optimization estimates robust policies fulfilling the spatially explicit interdependent safety requirements of the program.
Numerical experiments compare two alternative ways of calculating insurance premiums: the robust derived with ICRM and the AAL approaches. In the case of catastrophic flood losses, which occur as "spikes" in time and space, the AAL approach does not guarantee a proper balance between premiums and claims, and the insurer may experience a deficit in capital to cover all losses. Robust premiums calculated according to (11) - (14) make the insurer better-off. As known, in the Netherlands, most of the flood losses in "inside-dike" areas are covered by the government, private flood insurance is very limited.
In "outside-dike" areas, neither private nor public insurance is available. Therefore, the aim of the numerical experiments in sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 was to demonstrate the approach which improves attractiveness and stability of private insurance and therefore may increase insurability of flood risks in flood-exposed areas. Robust policies of the private insurance can be integrated with governmental support. The government may provide only limited compensation. The level of compensation substantially depends on the governmental budget, opinions of various stakeholders, involvement of private insurance.
Determining optimal share of governmental compensation requires modification of the model (11)- (14) and is a topic of the next paper.
We argue that because of significant interdependencies among catastrophic losses across different locations, the demand for a particular financial instrument cannot be separated from the demand for other risk transfer and risk reduction measures. In particular, our numerical experiments show that robust premiums of insurance decrease the demand for contingent credit, as discussed in section 4.2.3. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 explain how ICRM allows tuning robust premiums towards the required trade-off between the level of insurer's solvency and the overpayments by the individuals, thus increasing demand for the insurance and its take up rates. One of the future directions for the ICRM approach would be to consider a coupled choice of financial loss sharing measures among stakeholders and structural flood mitigation measures, such as zoning of certain land use functions, elevation of an area or particular buildings, and wet and dry flood-proofing (12) . We plan to better address the outlined stopping time concept and the spatio-temporal interdependencies among losses and robust policies.
